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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
rights have been taken by eminent domain, James v. Campbell (1881) 104
U. S. 356; Brady v. Atlantic Works (C. C. Mass. 1876) 3 Fed. Cas. 1190;
franchises, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States (1892) 148 U. S.
312; and even minority shares of stock in a railway corporation, Ofield V.
N. Y. Ry. Co. (1906) 203 U. S. 372. Gold, as a commodity, would appear to
be well within the scope of the rule. Several cases, however, contain the
somewhat forbidding dictum that money cannot be made the subject of
governmental appropriation. Cary Library v. Bliss (1890) 151 Mass. 364,
25 N. E. 92; Burnett v. City of Sacramento (1859) 12 Cal. 76, at 84; I Nichols
on Eminent-Domain (2d ed. 1917) p. 69. The rationale advanced is, that since
compensation itself must be made in money, usually payable in advance, any
attempt to confiscate money must end in a logical impasse; also that the
requisitioning of money is the function of taxation. People V. Mayor of
Brooklyn (1851) 4 N. Y. 419, at 424. The first objection is rendered purely
academical, for one thing, by the fact that Congress need not compensate at
the time of the taking. Campbell v. Uited States (1924) 266 U. S. 368. In
the light of the purpose of the present taking the second argument has little
pertinency.
The question of compensation is slightly more difficult. The measure is
the fair market value at time of taking. Boom Co. v. Patterson (1878) 98
U. S. 403. The owner is entitled to a "full and perfect equivalent of the
property taken." Seaboard Air Line By. v. United States (1923) 261 U. S.
299. The instant case presents an anomalous situation; for, if we assume the
power of the government to regulate gold as an adjunct of its control over the
currency, compensation is dictated entirely by the government, since the
value of gold is obviously confined to what the government declares it to be.
Thus compensation under the theory of eminent domain is largely shorn of
its essential effect. The requisition might more logically be based purely
upon the police power. C. B. P., '35.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT-
EMERGENCY LEGISLATION.-Chapter 339 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1933,
p. 514, called the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, provides that, during
the emergency declared to exist, relief may be had with respect to foreclosures
of mortgages; that sales may be postponed and periods of redemption may
be extended. Pursuant to the statute the plaintiff applied to the court for
an order extending the period of redemption from a foreclosure sale. A judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff was sustained by the state supreme court (249
N. W. 893). The constitutionality of the statute was upheld on the ground
of emergency although it was conceded that the obligations of the mortgage
contract were impaired. Held: The statute does not impair the obligation
of contract nor violate the due process or equal protection clauses. Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell (1934) 54 S. Ct. 231.
Innumerable cases have arisen under the contract clause of the United
States Constitution. They cannot be said definitely and clearly to have stated
the principle expressed in that clause. It is rather true that they have re-
stricted its application to a considerable agree. The fact that a state is a
party to the contract does not prevent the application of the clause. Fletcher
v. Peck (1810) 6 Cranch 87. Limitations have, however, been imposed. One
of the most important is that grants by states are to be construed strictly.
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Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837) 11 Pet. 420; Larson v. South
Dakota (1929) 278 U. S. 429. The contract clause cannot prevent the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain, West River Bridge v. Dix (1848) 6 How.
507; nor can the state contract away its power to legislate with regard to
public health, morals, safety, and welfare. Northwestern Fertilizing Co. v.
Village of Hyde Park (1878) 97 U. S. 659; 2 Willoughby, Constitutional Law
(2d ed. 1929) 1231; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed. 1927) 577.
With respect to purely private contracts the early decisions render the
prohibtion inflexible. Sturges v. Crowninshield (1819) 4 Wheat. 122;
Planters' Bank of Miss. v. Sharp (1848) 8 How. 301. If the form of the
remedy alone is changed the Constitution is not violated. The expression
of this qualification, however, has been in broad indefinite terms. Mc-
Cracken v. Hayward (1844) 2 How. 608. For instance, in Bronson v. Kinzie
(1843) 1 How. 311, it was said that whatever affects merely the remedy may
be altered by the state "provided the alteration does not impair the obligation
of contract"; or, Green v. Biddle (1823) 8 Wheat. 1, ". . . materially
. . . impair the rights and interests of the owner." Thus whether a par-
ticular alteration pertains only to the remedy or actually affects the con-
tractual obligation is somewhat tenous. See Feller, Moratory Legislation;
A Comparative Study (1933) 46 Harv. Law Rev. 1061; 2 Willoughby, Con-
stitutional Law (2d ed. 1929) 1223. Perhaps the process is one of gradual
judicial inclusion and exclusion.
Another limitation upon the application of the contract clause, whether
the agreement is purely private or not, is the state's exercise Of its police
power. Stone v. Mississippi (1880) 101 U. S. 814; Johnson, Contract Clause
of the United States Constitution (1928) 16 Ky. Law J. 222. It is because
of this limitation that the clause has declined in importance in the last fifty
years. Note (1932) 32 Col. Law Rev. 476. Private contracts have practi-
cally been absorbed in the broader concept of due process. It has been
specifically stated that the problem is supplemental to that of due process.
Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel (1922) 258 U. S. 242; Marcus Brown Holding Co.
v. Feldman (1921) 256 U. S. 170. Very often, now, the contract clause is
not considered but reliance is placed entirely upon the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Producers' Transp. Co. v. R. R. Commission of Calif. (1920) 251 U. S.
228; Ft. Smith Spelter Co. v. Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. (1925) 267 U. S.
231; Sutter Butte Canal Co. v. R. R. Com. (1929) 279 U. S. 125.
The question is further complicated by the ingrafting upon the due process
principle the emergency justification. This, in the last analysis, is the real
basis of the decision of the principal case. The question ultimately is whether
emergency, along with public health, morals, safety and welfare should be-
come part of the police power. Past decisions would have had to be over-
ruled specifically if reliance had not been placed upon the existing emergency.
Bronson v. Kinzie, supra; Barnitz v. Beverly (1896) 163 U. S. 118. When
it is said that an emergency does not create power but merely supplies the
occasion for its exercise the court indulges in so much verbiage. The real
explanation of the decision is the constitutional approach of the lbourt; this
is the actual difference between the majority and the minority. Mr. Justice
Sutherland interprets the Constitution as of the time it was written while
Chief Justice Hughes interprets it as if written contemporaneously with
the enactment of the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law. N. P., '34.
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